Constitutional Law: Due Process: Termination of Social Security Benefits: Prior Evidentiary Hearing Not Required (Matthews v. Eldridge) by Soeka, Eva M.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 60
Issue 1 Fall 1976 Article 6
Constitutional Law: Due Process: Termination of
Social Security Benefits: Prior Evidentiary Hearing
Not Required (Matthews v. Eldridge)
Eva M. Soeka
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Eva M. Soeka, Constitutional Law: Due Process: Termination of Social Security Benefits: Prior Evidentiary Hearing Not Required (Matthews
v. Eldridge), 60 Marq. L. Rev. 129 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol60/iss1/6
RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Termination of Social
Security Disability Benefits-Prior Evidentiary Hearing
Not Required-In Matthews v. Eldridge,' the United States
Supreme Court was again asked to give judicial definition to
the most amorphous of constitutional concepts, "due pro-
cess."12 The Court was presented with the question: does "due
process" require an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation
of a property interest in the form of Social Security disability
payments? 3 Distinguishing Goldberg v. Kelly,4 which estab-
lished a right to an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of
welfare payments, the Court, with only one dissent, 5 answered
''no.)'
Matthews v. Eldridge arose when the plaintiff, Eldridge,
challenged administrative regulations of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare which allowed a termination
of benefits in cases of disputed disability.' These procedures
1. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
2. For a discussion of due process in differing legal contexts, see generally, Ginger,
Due Process in Practice or Whatever's Fair, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 897 (1974).
3. The term "evidentiary hearing" throughout this article refers to the type of
hearing required by the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). This type of
hearing includes the following elements: (1) "timely and adequate notice detailing the
reasons for the proposed termination"; (2) "an effective opportunity to defend by
confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence
orally"; (3) retained counsel, if desired; (4) an "impartial" decisionmaker; (5) a deci-
sion resting "solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing"; (6) a
statement of reasons for the decision and the evidence relied on. 397 U.S. at 266-71.
This is the definition used by the Eldridge Court as indicated in note 4 of that opinion.
424 U.S. at 325.
4. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In the six years following Goldberg and preceding Eldridge,
a gradual erosion of the Court's apparently absolute requirement of an evidentiary
hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits has occurred. See, e.g., Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972); Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). Thus, the decision in Eldridge, while in direct conflict
with at least the spirit of the Goldberg holding, is not surprising. Some authorities
attribute this change of position to the change in composition of the Court, particularly
the addition of the Nixon appointees. See Brudno, Fairness and Bureaucracy: The
Demise of Procedural Due Process for Welfare Claimants, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 813 (1974).
5. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision. Justice Brennan was the sole dis-
senter. Interestingly, Justice Brennan was also the author of the Court's opinion in
Goldberg.
6. Eldridge was first awarded benefits in June 1968 under the 1956 amendments
to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 433 (1965). In March 1972 he completed a
detailed questionnaire for the state agency charged with monitoring his condition,
indicating that he had not improved. After obtaining physical and psychiatric reports,
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provided the terminated recipients with a right to seek reconsi-
deration of this initial determination within six months. Eld-
ridge argued that this termination with right to subsequent
review violated his right to procedural due process under the
fifth amendment.7
Reversing both the district court' and the court of appeals,9
the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Powell, con-
cluded that "the present administrative procedures fully com-
port with due process."1 The Court distinguished the situation
of the disability claimant in Eldridge from that of the welfare
claimant in Goldberg. First, eligibility for disability benefits,
unlike eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on financial
need. Presumably, disability claimants do not rely, as do wel-
fare claimants, on these benefits as their only source of in-
come.II Secondly, an evidentiary hearing would be less effective
in settling disability claims, which turn primarily on medical
evidence, than in settling welfare claims which turn on the
credibility of the claimant. 2 Finally, the Court reasoned that
requiring a pre-termination evidentiary hearing in disability
cases, unlike in welfare cases, would entail fiscal and adminis-
the state agency determined that his disability ceased in May 1972. In a written
response, Eldridge claimed to have arthritis of the spine rather than the back sprain
for which he was originally awarded benefits. The Social Security Administration,
however, accepted the state's determination and notified Eldridge in July 1972 that
his benefits would terminate as of that month. He was also advised that he could seek
reconsideration of this termination within six months.
7. Essential to the concept of procedural due process is the requirement that the
hearing occur prior to the deprivation, since "[tihe purpose of the due process clause
is not to restore property which has been improperly taken - there are other remedies
for that - but to prevent a wrongful or mistaken taking in the first place." Rubenstein,
Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the Adversary System, 11 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS
- Civ. LiB. L. REv. 48, 52 (1976). See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-
79 (1971).
8. 361 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973).
9. 493 F.2d 1230 (1974).
10. 424 U.S. at 349.
11. In his dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that although disability benefits are
not designed to be the primary source of income, in fact they often are. Moreover, the
Court has repeatedly and clearly held that the due process requirement of a pre-
termination hearing is not limited to situations involving the deprivation of vital
necessities. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 89 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971).
12. The view that medical reports are prima facie reliable because of their assumed
objectivity has been seriously questioned. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 411
(1970) (Douglas, J. dissenting). See also Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by
Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1510,
1516 n. 34 (1975).
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trative burdens disproportionate to any countervailing bene-
fits.' 3 Thus, the justices concluded that "[t]he judicial model
of an evidentiary hearing is neither required, nor even the most
effective, method of decision making in all circumstances."' 4
While it is clear that an evidentiary hearing is not required in
all circumstances, in light of Eldridge and Goldberg, it is un-
clear under what circumstances such a hearing will be required
in order to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Long before Eldridge, due process analysis had evolved into
a two-step inquiry.15 The Court initially asks whether the due
process clause applies, i.e., whether the challenged governmen-
tal action infringes upon a liberty or property interest protected
by due process. This step requires an examination of the nature
or quality of the interest involved rather than its "weight."' 6 If
the interest is determined to be of constitutional significance,
the Court then examines what procedural safeguards are neces-
sary to protect that right. To determine what process is "due"
within the meaning of the fifth amendment, a balancing test
is used: the individual's need for procedural safeguards is
weighed against the government's interest in summary or infor-
mal action.17 Since the first step has become little more than a
pro forma scrutiny of the interest involved, the balancing test
13. 424 U.S. at 349.
14. Id.
15. This analysis closely parallels the two-tier framework which has characterized
equal protection analysis. Under equal protection analysis the Court initially inquires
whether the challenged classification impinges upon a fundamental right or creates a
suspect classification. If this threshold question is answered affirmatively, the Court
invokes strict judicial scrutiny. The burden of proof is on the state to demonstrate,
under rigorous judicial examination, that the challenged statute's classification serves
a compelling state interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). On the other
hand, if neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved, the Court
applies the second-tier rational basis test. In deference to the legislative wisdom, the
court requires the person challenging the classification to prove that it has no rational
basis, i.e., that it is not reasonably related to a permissible statutory purpose. The
fifth amendment due process clause was expanded to include the concept of equal
protection in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Since that time, some authorities
believe the Court has blurred the line between the due process and equal protection
clauses searching rather for what is constitutionally "fair." See generally, Ginger, Due
Process in Practice or Whatever's Fair, 25 HASTINGS L. Rav. 897 (1974).
16. "Weight" is used in the sense of importance to the individual whereas "qual-
ity" or "nature" refers to constitutional importance. An interest may be of extreme
importance to the individual and yet not be deserving of constitutional protection. See
Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use
of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975).
17. Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1975).
1976]
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has become the focal point of most due process challenges.'
Matthews v. Eldridge is no exception to this rule.
Before applying due process analysis to the Eldridge case,
the Court was confronted with a threshold issue of whether the
district court had jurisdiction over the action. Relying on
Weinberger v. Salfi, 1, the government contended that Eldridge
had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as re-
quired by 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), the only avenue for judicial
review of a denial of disability benefits. 0 Salfi recognized that
''central to the requisite grant of subject matter jurisdiction"
under section 405(g) was the requirement that there be a final
decision by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
after a hearing.2 '
The Eldridge Court noted, however, that this requirement
was composed of two distinct elements, one waivable and one
nonwaivable. 2 The waivable element is the requirement that
the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be
exhausted. The nonwaivable element is the requirement that
a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary.
While Eldridge had not exhausted the available administrative
procedures nor had the Secretary "waived" this element, Eld-
ridge had fulfilled "the crucial prerequisite" of presenting his
claim for benefits to the Secretary.23 Furthermore, in the
Court's words, "[C]ases may arise where a claimant's interest
in having a particular issue resolved promptly is so great that
deference to the agency's judgment is inappropriate. This is
such a case. '2 4 Since only the nonwaivable element was purely
jurisdictional, the Court concluded that the district court prop-
erly entertained the suit."
After discussing this preliminary issue, the majority next
turned to the first step of due process analysis, the nature of
the right involved. According to the Court, although in the past
18. See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits
on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1510 (1975).
19. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
20. In Salfi, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970) precludes federal ques-
tion jurisdiction in an action challenging denial of claimed benefits. Id. at 756-67.
21. Id. at 764.
22. The Eldridge Court, however, noted that these elements are "implicit" rather
than expressed in Salfi. 424 U.S. at 328.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 330.
25. Id. at 332.
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disability benefits may have been viewed as privileges or gratu-
ities flowing from the government," the law recognizes that
modern property interests can take a variety of forms not in-
cluded in common-law concepts. 7 While a comprehensive
analysis of the development of legally recognized property in-
terests is beyond the scope of this article, they include such
diverse arrangements as automobile franchises, pension rights,
and farm subsidies. The Goldberg Court recognized that gov-
ernmental benefits are among this group of modern property
interests: "[S]uch benefits are a matter of statutory entitle-
ment for persons qualified to receive them. ' 29 Realizing that by
virtue of this statement the Goldberg Court ended debate as to
whether the due process clause applies to government benefits,
the Secretary in Eldridge did not challenge the nature of the
interest involved, but rather contended that existing proce-
dures "provide all the process that is constitutionally due be-
fore a recipient can be deprived of that interest."3
Essentially, the Secretary put before the Court the funda-
mental, but legally puzzling question of what is due process.
In its attempt to answer this question, the Eldridge Court be-
came entangled in the attempts of previous courts to answer
the same question.3 Whatever form these judicial answers have
taken, the Court noted, the essence of due process remains the
opportunity to be heard at a "meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner. '32 Eldridge's challenge was based on the idea
that this right had been denied him by a termination of his
benefits prior to a determination of the continuance of his disa-
bility. However, the Court concluded that while due process
requires a "meaningful" hearing, the procedural safeguards
necessary to insure that right constitutionally may vary with
the circumstances. 3
26. See Rubenstein, Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the Adversary
System, 11 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS - Civ. LiB. L. REV. 48 (1976).
27. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n. 8 (1970).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 424 U.S. at 332-33.
31. Id.
32. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
33. 424 U.S. at 334. The Eldridge case illustrates perfectly the continuing conflict
between the theory that the Constitution is a living instrument adaptable to the "crises
of human affairs" and the theory that constitutional cases are not decided by the
"social and economic predilections" of nine old men. See Lochner v. New York, 198
1976]
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Although due process "is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"3
the Eldridge Court noted that it is subject to a more concrete
definition. Relying on prior decisions, the Court listed three
considerations in determining whether the requirements of due
process have been met: first, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest includ-
ing the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural require-
ments would entail." The Court observed that in only one case,
the termination of welfare benefits, did these considerations
require an evidentiary hearing.36 In all other cases, procedures
substantially less burdensome for the state than the eviden-
tiary hearing have been held to satisfy due process. 7 In view
of the decision in Goldberg to require an evidentiary hearing for
a denial of similar government payments, it came as a surprise
that the Court did not also require an evidentiary hearing in
Eldridge. However, after an application of the three due pro-
cess considerations above, the Court instead chose to demon-
strate how procedural due process requirements can vary ac-
cording to the situation.
The Court began its analysis by considering the private
interest to be affected by the governmental action. In Eldridge,
the disability claimant's "sole interest is in the uninterrupted
receipt of this income pending final administrative decision on
his claim." To assess the potential injury which may result
from the existing procedures, the Court examined the degree
and length of a possible wrongful deprivation. The Court ac-
knowledged that the delay between the termination of benefits
and final decision after a hearing may exceed a year.39 How-
U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819).
34. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
35. 424 U.S. at 335. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-271 (1970).
36. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
37. The Court specifically cited Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (dismissal
of federal employee); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (revocation of driver's li-
cense); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment of wages).
38. 424 U.S. at 340 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 342. The Eldridge Court commented on the "torpidity" of the present
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ever, the disability recipient, unlike the welfare recipient,
whose benefits are based on financial need, does not rely on his
benefits as "the very means by which to live."4 He may have
access to private resources or other forms of governmental as-
sistance.4' Thus, the majority concluded that while "the hard-
ship imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recip-
ient may be significant . . . it is less than that of the welfare
recipient. ' '42
Secondly, the Court considered the fairness and reliability
of the existing pre-termination procedures, and the value, if
any, of additional procedural safeguards. Focusing on the na-
ture of the claim, the majority reasoned that disability disputes
turn on medical assessments which are more easily docu-
mented and reduced to written presentation." In contrast, wel-
fare cases produce issues of veracity and sincerity which are
more effectively decided through the cross-examination in-
volved in an oral hearing.4 To support their reasoning as to the
objectivity of written medical reports the Court relied on
Richardson v. Perales,45 which upheld a finding of nondisability
on the basis of a hearsay physician's report despite challenges
of the denial of the right to confrontation and cross-examina-
tion. " In addition, the Eldridge Court noted that the recipient
is periodically sent a detailed questionnaire, is given full access
to all information, and may at all times submit new informa-
tion. 7 Considering these safeguards, the Court reasoned that
administrative review, but based its decision on the view that these benefits are not
the sole source of income and therefore their termination even for the period of a year
would not result in "grievous hardship" to the benefidiary.
40. 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
41. Justice Brennan termed these arguments "no argument" at all. 424 U.S. at 350.
See note 54 infra.
42. 424 U.S. at 342.
43. See note 12 supra.
44. Cross-examination may prove useful in exposing inaccuracies, ambiguities and
faulty medical reasoning.
45. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
46. In his dissent in Richardson, Justice Douglas pointed out that the only doctor
who testified at the hearing stated that the claimant was permanently disabled. Five
others submitted written reports challenging the disability. One of these was a medical
advisor to H.E.W. who had never examined the claimant. Three others were experts
retained and paid by the government. Assessing these facts, Justice Douglas stated,
"Cross-examination of doctors in these physical injury cases is, I think, essential to a
full and fair disclosure of the facts." 402 U.S. at 412.
47. These procedures, however, do not serve to remedy the hardship caused by a
wrongful termination of benefits.
19761
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the value of an evidentiary hearing would be minimal.
The final factor examined by the Court was the public in-
terest. The public interest is measured in terms of the adminis-
trative and fiscal burdens incurred by requiring an evidentiary
hearing prior to the termination of disability benefits. 8 The
fiscal cost alone resulting from the increased number of hear-
ings and the expense of providing benefits during the pendency
of a decision would not be "insubstantial."49 Although ac-
knowledging that the requirements of the due process clause
cannot be shaped by these more practical concerns, the Court
nevertheless held that "[t]he ultimate balance involves a de-
termination as to when, under our constitutional system,
judicial-type procedures must be imposed upon administrative
action to assure fairness."5 After considering the procedures
prior to any administrative action and "the good-faith judg-
ments"'" of administrators, the majority concluded that the
existing procedures, with a right to subsequent judicial review,
satisfied this constitutional requirement of "fairness. '52
The soundness, both logical and constitutional, of the Su-
preme Court's decision rests upon its distinction between the
disability recipient in Eldridge and the welfare recipient in
Goldberg. Yet, upon closer examination, these distinctions are
questionable. While in theory disability benefits are not based
on financial need, in reality, these benefits are often the recipi-
ent's only source of income. 2 Justice Brennan pointed out in
his dissent that upon termination of the benefits "there was a
foreclosure upon the Eldridge home and the family's furniture
was repossessed, forcing Eldridge, his wife, and children to
sleep in one bed." 53 In addition, the Court's reliance on the
existence of "other sources of government aid" is misplaced,
48. State interests may take two general forms: protecting substantive state objec-
tives and minimizing adminstrative burdens. Note, Specifying the Procedures Re-
quired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1510, 1515 (1975).
49. 424 U.S. at 347.
50. Id.
51. The Court's reliance on the "good-faith judgments" of administrators may be
misplaced since the relationship between the administrator and the claimant is by
nature adversarial. This would appear to intensify the need for an impartial decision
maker who would not be influenced even subconsciously by considerations of bureau-
cratic efficiency and economy. See Brudno, Fairness and Bureaucracy: The Demise of
Procedural Due Process for Welfare Claimants, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 813 (1974).
52. 424 U.S. at 341.
53. Id. at 350.
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since these other sources often use the same definition of
disability to determine eligibility that is at issue in a termina-
tion of disability benefits dispute.54 Secondly, the Court's rea-
soning that the use of written medical reports is an effective
method of resolving disability disputes requires "an implicit
judgment that the device of cross-examination is more useful
in the detection of insincerity than in the exposure of ambigui-
ties, faulty perception, or inaccurate memory." 55 Finally, while
the majority paid lip service to the doctrine that administrative
cost and convenience will not shape constitutional require-
ments,5" the Court found that considerations of the public fisc
overshadowed Eldridge's right to be heard "at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner. ' 57
In relying on "fairness" for its "ultimate determination," '58
the Eldridge Court has come full circle, returning to its initial
inquiry: what is due process? But its answer to this question
was merely a restatement of the words of a previous Court:
[T]he essence of due process is the requirement that a per-
son in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it."5 Justice Brennan has
noted that the Court's due process analysis has increasingly
focused on answering the question: "What sort of right is it
which enjoys absolutely no procedural protection?"6 In
Eldridge the Court has moved one step closer to the answer.
While the interest disputed in Eldridge enjoys some procedural
protection, the Court's holding in this case accorded it far less
than traditional definitions of due process would require.
EVA M. SOEKA
54. See 424 U.S. at 342-43 n. 27.
55. Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on
the Use of Interest Balancing. 88 HA-v. L. REv. 1510, 1516, n.34 (1975).
56. 424 U.S. at 348.
57. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
58. 424 U.S. at 348.
59. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
60. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 900 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
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